气候极端事件与气候变化因敲诈性搭便车者过度压榨减缓者而加剧——一项经济学实验

Climate extreme events and climate change are enforced by extortionate freeriders overloading those who mitigate – An economic experiment

Ecological Economics · 2025
被引 0
ABS 3

中文导读

通过实验室实验,研究群体中敲诈性搭便车者如何迫使公平贡献者过度补偿,导致集体减缓目标失败,从而解释气候变化持续存在的机制。

Abstract

Climate extremes have become more frequent and severe due to excessive human emissions, yet it remains unclear whether the threat of costly hazards spurs collective mitigation. In a laboratory experiment, groups of six players contributed individually toward a collective target that, if unmet, triggered a simulated climate catastrophe and forfeiture of their endowment. Some groups also faced intermediate climate events, avoidable through sufficient mitigation to prevent costly losses. Although many groups suffered from losses, they reached the final target as often as the control groups without simulated climate events. Player behavior had two variants: “fair players”, who consistently contributed their share, and “extortioners”, who free-rode and forced others to compensate for their lack of contribution. Groups were randomly composed of participants, whose observed behavior revealed between 0 and 5 individuals acting as extortioners. When extortion became overwhelming, fair players failed to absorb the deficit, groups missed the target and steadfast extortioners incurred losses too. Extortioners disregarded losses and accumulated a large gain while fair players earned little. Nonetheless, fair players' best response was to accede to extortion and cover the deficit. Extortion decreased mitigation across all conditions. Our findings may help to illustrate mechanisms also relevant in the real world where individual actions e.g., leisure travel on giant cruise ships or running power plants with coal, and much else, ultimately prevent collective success. In 2024, global CO 2 emissions and temperatures reached record highs, stressing the inability of fair players to compensate the deficit caused by freeriders. This dynamic suggests that the persistence of climate change stems from the unwavering behavior of extortioners in contexts outside of the laboratory.

气候变化实验经济学公共品博弈搭便车减缓行动