The effect of coarse reasoning on a search and matching market with transferable utility
研究了在具有可转移效用的摩擦性搜寻匹配市场中，引入基于类比的有限理性预期后，代理人低估市场前景、变得不耐烦并接受更多匹配，导致比理性预期更大的错配。
This paper studies a frictional search and matching market with transferable utility while relaxing the assumption of rational expectations. This is done by introducing bounded rationality in the form of analogy-based expectations equilibrium. I find that boundedly rational agents underestimate their prospects on the market. Consequently, they become impatient and willing to accept a larger set of matches. The resulting equilibrium outcome is characterized by greater mismatch than that with rational expectations. The effect of analogy-based expectations on equilibrium strategies is similar to the effect of search frictions. Hence, reducing the search frictions may dampen the negative effect induced by bounded rationality.