Democratization, personal wealth of politicians and voting behavior
研究了1850-1920年间西欧民主化进程中，荷兰政治家的个人财富如何影响其投票行为，发现财富越高的政治家越可能反对增税，但对扩大选举权的投票无显著影响。
Between about 1850 and 1920, Western Europe underwent a period of democratization and liberalization, resulting in the expansion of government and the establishment of universal suffrage. This paper examines the impact of politicians’ personal wealth on this process, with a focus on the case of The Netherlands, using data from newly-collected probate inventories as a measure of politicians’ wealth. The paper finds that the wealth of parliaments decreased significantly over time, and that richer politicians were more likely to vote against fiscal legislation, suggesting that personal wealth negatively influenced the probability of increasing taxes and played a role in determining government size. The analyses presented in the paper support a causal interpretation of these results. However, the study finds no significant relationship between politicians’ personal wealth and their voting behavior on suffrage extensions.