Firm ownership and pollution
研究了股东所有权分布如何影响企业内化污染的程度，发现小股东更倾向于环保，而股权集中或分散化程度高的国家污染更严重。
We provide a theoretical micro foundation for how much pollution (negative externalities) a firm will internalize based on the ownership distribution of its shareholders. Small shareholders, compared to large ones, want the firm to spend more on avoiding pollution since they suffer less profit loss for the same environmental benefit. In particular, if a shareholder holds a share of 1 / N , where N is the population in society, that shareholder’s preferences align with a social planner’s. Three theoretical predictions arise. First, small shareholders will systematically vote for a greener corporate profile. Second, firms with a smaller weighted-median shareholder will pollute less. Third, countries with concentrated corporate wealth holdings and/or more individualized firm ownership will pollute more. This implies that standard models of externalities in environmental economics and macroeconomics containing representative agents are either internally inconsistent or not fully specified.