Sequential credit markets
研究了企业家在分散化市场中序贯寻求融资时，私人信息投资者导致的动态逆向选择外部性，解释了过度投资、中介超额租金及市场结构对效率的影响。
Entrepreneurs typically seek financing in decentralized markets, where they approach investors sequentially. We develop a model of sequential capital markets with privately informed investors. The sequential market creates a dynamic adverse selection externality that leads to overinvestment and excessive rents to intermediaries, even as the number of competing investors becomes arbitrary large. The resulting rents lead to excessive entry of investors and insufficient entry of entrepreneurs. Moving to a centralized market structure or reducing transparency restores competitiveness but may harm efficiency. The model also explains how even a small skill advantage for an investor can lead to preferential deal flow and outsized returns.