On the Fragility of Mediation: Theory and Experimental Evidence
实验检验了理论上最优的调解算法，发现调解在最有希望时反而脆弱，任何微小的不诚实都会导致协议概率骤降。
Abstract Mediation of disputes is increasingly common, often implemented by computer-run algorithms. We test the efficacy of a theoretically optimal mediation algorithm in an experiment where two subjects, uncertain about each other’s strength, negotiate how to share a resource. The subjects send cheap talk messages to one another (under direct communication) or to the computer mediator (under mediated communication) before expressing demands or receiving the mediator’s non-binding recommendation. While messages to the mediator are more sincere, we find that peaceful resolution is not more frequent. The theoretical analysis shows that mediation is fragile precisely when it is most promising. When the optimal equilibrium improves over direct communication, any deviation from full truthfulness, no matter how small, causes a discontinuous downward jump in the probability of agreement.