Allocation Mechanisms with Mixture-Averse Preferences
研究在等量多种商品的经济中，具有严格拟凸偏好（对彩票）的代理人如何分配。发现事前所有帕累托有效分配几乎只给代理人最多两种结果的彩票，并指出许多流行分配机制事前无效。
Consider an economy with equal amounts of N types of goods, to be allocated to agents with strict quasi-convex preferences over lotteries. We show that ex ante, all Pareto-efficient allocations give almost all agents lotteries over at most two outcomes. Our results provide a simple criterion showing that many popular allocation mechanisms are ex ante inefficient. For the case of identical preferences, we establish existence of an efficient solution where all lotteries used are equally attractive. Assuming the reduction axiom, social welfare deteriorates by first randomizing over these binary lotteries. Efficient ex ante equality is achieved if agents satisfy the compound-independence axiom.