Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality, and Effort Provision
通过实地和实验室实验，发现激励方案的复杂性和工人的有限理性会影响努力供给，因为工人会忽略部分激励属性，导致努力水平高于完全理性基准，从而提升效率。
Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision. This is because some attributes of the incentives become opaque; that is, workers do not take them into account. In our setting, workers overprovide effort relative to a fully rational benchmark, improving efficiency. We identify contract features, and facets of worker cognitive ability, that matter for opacity. We find that even relatively small degrees of opacity can cause large shifts in behavior. Our results illustrate important implications of complexity and bounded rationality for designing and regulating workplace incentive contracts.