The Effects of CEO Dismissal of Product Market Competitors on Audit Risk
研究发现，当产品市场同行公司强制解雇CEO时，审计师会向客户公司收取更高费用，并更可能出具非标准审计意见，表明同行CEO解雇放大了审计风险。
This paper focuses on whether and how peer‐forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover affects audit risk. This research reveals that auditors charge higher fees for client firms when product market peers dismiss CEOs. Its findings are consistent with the prediction that the forced turnover of peer firms transmits product market‐wide risk, prompting auditors to heighten risk assessments. Affected firms are also more likely to receive modified audit opinions and to meet or beat the zero earnings threshold, as well as exhibit higher abnormal accruals. These findings demonstrate that peer CEO dismissals amplify audit risks. This research also reveals that the positive influence of forced CEO turnover on audit risk is mitigated by a better information environment and longer audit tenure.