Nonfragile Fault-Tolerant Control for Power Cyber-Physical Systems With Cyber Attacks
针对电力信息物理系统在隐蔽拒绝服务攻击下的控制问题，提出一种基于隐藏半马尔可夫链的非脆弱容错控制方案，通过构建依赖攻击模式和观测模式的Lyapunov函数保证系统均方稳定，仿真验证了有效性。
This work addresses the nonfragile fault-tolerant control for power cyber-physical systems (CPSs) under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, in which the cyber attacks are considered to be strongly concealed. In the fact of power CPSs frequently subject to various attacks during the operation, the innovation is to construct a double-layer stochastic process composed of a semi-Markov chain and a sequence of observed mode to analyze the DoS attacks from the viewpoint of hidden semi-Markov chain. To address potential actuator failures and controller gain perturbations, an observed-mode-dependent nonfragile control scheme is developed. By constructing a mode-dependent Lyapunov function that incorporates both attack modes and observed modes, sufficient conditions are derived to ensure mean-square stability of the closed-loop system through the semi-Markov kernel (SMK) approach, which systematically handles the stochastic characteristics of dwell time (DT) distributions under incomplete attack mode information. Finally, a simulation example demonstrates the validity of the proposed approach.