Gender and firm-level corruption: new evidence from MENA
利用2013-2020年中东和北非企业贿赂面板数据，发现女性管理者支付贿赂金额更小，但被索贿频率更高，挑战了女性因较少被索贿而支付更少贿赂的观点。
Abstract We integrate the gender of firm managers into theoretical frameworks on corruption to analyze the incidence, magnitude, and demands of informal payments. Drawing on a unique panel dataset on bribery by firms in MENA from 2013 to 2020, we find that gender differences in bribery incidence diminish in contexts with weak corruption control. While female managers are not less likely to pay bribes, they consistently pay smaller amounts. A firm’s propensity to pay bribes is influenced more by the control exerted by public officials and the firm’s visibility than by the manager’s gender. Our results also reveal that female managers are more frequently solicited for informal payments, with particularly strong evidence in Egypt. This challenges the notion that women pay smaller bribes because they face fewer demands. Contrary to prior research, our findings highlight the central role of the extent of authority or discretion held by public officials (i.e., control rights) in determining not only the incidence of bribes but also the amounts paid.