Do trade agreements actually reduce trade volatility?
使用结构引力模型和双边行业层面贸易数据，研究了区域贸易协定和GATT/WTO成员资格对出口收入波动的影响，发现GATT降低了波动，但区域贸易协定反而增加了波动。
Abstract A frequently stated objective of regional and multilateral trade agreements is to provide a more stable and certain trading environment. Does this translate into reduced volatility of trade flows? Using a structural gravity approach, we identify two potential channels through which international trade institutions may influence the volatility of bilateral trade flows: by affecting the variance of trade barriers and by affecting the covariance of economic outcomes between the trading partners. We then use a panel of bilateral industry‐level trade data to empirically examine the effects of regional trade agreements and GATT/WTO membership on export earnings volatility. We find some evidence that joining a multilateral trade agreement such as the GATT makes export earnings less volatile. However, we find even stronger evidence that membership in a regional trade agreement increases the measured volatility in bilateral exports with other regional trading partners, and this rise in volatility increases as the agreement becomes deeper and more integrated. This increased volatility could be due to increased co‐movements of economic outcomes across regional trading partners; we also demonstrate that regional trade agreements increase the industry‐level covariance of importer expenditure and exporter production among member countries.