CEO Social Capital, Board Connectedness, and Anchor Investors: A Study of Initial Public Offerings
研究了香港股市中CEO社会资本、董事网络和锚定投资者参与如何影响IPO的短期和长期表现，发现高关联度的CEO和董事会能提升短期需求倍数，锚定投资者则强化正面效应，且这些影响持续到上市后的运营和股价表现。
ABSTRACT Research Question/Issue This study investigates the role of CEO social capital, director networks, and anchor investor participation in influencing the short‐ and long‐term performance outcomes of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Hong Kong stock market. Research Findings/Insights Studying a sample of 1155 IPOs listed in Hong Kong from 2004 to 2019, we find that highly connected CEOs and boards significantly enhance short‐term IPO performance as measured by demand multiples. We find that anchor investors' participations strengthen the positive performance of the IPO firms. We show that the positive effects of CEO and board networks are beyond the short‐term outcomes and significantly contribute to enhanced operating performance, higher market‐adjusted returns, and higher survival rates post listing. These results are robust to endogeneity concerns and shed further light on the value of social capital and anchor investors' participation for IPO firms. Theoretical/Academic Implications This study advances corporate governance research by highlighting the critical role of social capital in IPO success, particularly for a well‐regulated market outside the United States and Europe. It extends the literature on board and executive networks by demonstrating their complementary relationship with institutional investors, such as anchor investors, in enhancing both short‐ and long‐term IPO outcomes. Practitioner/Policy Implications The findings underscore the importance of leveraging CEO and board networks alongside unique institutional (i.e., anchor) investors to boost IPO success. Policymakers and stock exchange regulators can draw on these insights to design regulatory frameworks that foster stakeholder collaboration, reduce information asymmetry, and promote better governance practices in IPO markets.