Learn From Ties: The Effect of Board Interlocks on Asymmetric Cost Behavior
研究发现，董事会连锁通过提供商业信息降低需求不确定性，使企业成本粘性减弱，且这种效应在需求不确定性高、信息价值大或董事信息处理能力强时更显著。
ABSTRACT This study investigates the relationship between board interlocks and asymmetric cost behavior. We argue that board interlocks facilitate resource allocation decisions by providing business‐related information that can reduce uncertainty about future demand. Using cost stickiness as a proxy for operating decisions related to resource adjustment, we find that firms with a higher proportion of interlocking directors exhibit significantly less sticky cost structures. Moreover, the negative association between board interlocks and cost stickiness is stronger for firms facing greater demand uncertainty, when the value of information is higher, and when interlocking directors demonstrate greater information‐processing capabilities. These findings are robust to alternative network‐based measures of board interlocks and hold after addressing potential endogeneity. Overall, our study highlights the informational role of interlocking directors in influencing firms’ resource adjustment and cost behavior.