Platform Liability and Innovation
研究了平台移除侵权产品的激励，以及平台责任对创新和福利的影响，发现责任可能提高或降低佣金率，促进或阻碍创新，取决于跨群体网络外部性的强度。
ABSTRACT We study a platform's incentives to remove IP‐infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for such infringements on innovation and welfare. We first show that platform liability can lead to either higher or lower commission rates, depending on how screening affects transaction volume. We then show that liability may spur or hinder innovation, depending on the intensity of cross‐group network externalities, which determines participation elasticities on each side. If platform liability lowers innovation, all market participants—the platform, innovators, imitators, and buyers—are worse off. We also provide a sufficient condition for platform liability to raise welfare.