Behavioral implementation by individual-based rights structures: A full characterization
研究了当个体选择存在非理性行为（如诱饵效应、选择超载、折中效应）时，规划者如何通过设计个体权利结构来实施社会选择规则，并完整刻画了可实施规则的类别。
Behavioral implementation studies the social choice rules that a planner can implement when individuals’ choice behavior need not be rational. Existing results cannot determine which social choice rules are behaviorally implementable when individuals’ choices exhibit significant choice anomalies such as decoy effect, choice overload, and compromise effect. We improve the situation by fully identifying the class of social choice rules behaviorally implementable by individual-based rights structures. In this framework, the planner designs an individual-based rights structure, which specifies rights of individuals to change the status-quo outcome of the society. It turns out that the key to a full characterization is to understand which condition should replace unanimity when individuals’ choices are non-rational.