Enforceable transitional provisions in national constitutions
研究新宪法秩序中过渡条款的角色、范围和可执行性，通过肯尼亚、巴西、哥伦比亚和尼泊尔的案例，分析制宪者与执行者之间的信任关系如何影响条款设计。
Abstract Transitional provisions are a key device for managing institutional transformation in new constitutional orders. We analyze transitional provisions through the lens of the intertemporal assessment of who will hold power under the new constitution. The role, scope and enforceability of transitional provisions will be different when parties to the constitutional bargain expect that they and their allies are likely to be in power, as opposed to when the relationship between drafters and prospective implementers is one of uncertainty, distrust or both. We illustrate our argument with case studies from Kenya, Brazil, Colombia and Nepal.