Decentralized Finance risk transfer and smart contract-based insurance
建立模型分析风险规避者如何在传统保险与去中心化金融（DeFi）智能合约保险之间选择，发现DeFi保险在基差和违约风险适中或定价优势显著时可补充或替代传统保险，提升福利。
This paper presents a model in which risk-averse individuals can purchase insurance via traditional indemnity contracts or Decentralized Finance (DeFi) smart contract-based instruments. The model incorporates key features of DeFi insurance, including parametric payouts, basis risk arising from imperfect loss verification and pooled collateralization involving the risk of liquidity shortfalls. We characterize optimal insurance choices as a function of pricing, payout correlation and risk preferences. Numerical results show that DeFi insurance can complement or replace traditional coverage, improving welfare when basis and default risks are moderate or pricing advantages are substantial. The analysis reveals how DeFi-specific frictions shape insurance demand and provides insight into how DeFi instruments may shift market structure and expand the set of attainable risk transfer outcomes.