Cooperatives’ ‘one-shareholder-one-vote’ principle and financial reporting quality
研究发现，允许多重投票权的德国合作社财务报告质量显著低于坚持“一人一票”原则的合作社，表现为更高的可操控应计利润。
Unlike corporations, cooperatives are typically governed by the democratic principle of ‘one shareholder, one vote’, ensuring that every member has an equal say, regardless of the amount of capital they contribute. However, some cooperatives allow members to have multiple voting rights. Our study, based on a sample from Germany, reveals that cooperatives that allow multiple voting rights tend to exhibit significantly lower financial reporting quality, as indicated by higher discretionary accruals, compared to those that adhere to the ‘one-shareholder-one-vote’ principle. These results remain robust after applying propensity score matching, using different measures of financial reporting quality, and considering the endogenous choice to allow multiple voting rights. This study adds to the emerging literature on cooperatives’ financial reporting practices and explores the relationship between owners’ voting power and financial reporting quality.