Adverse Selection in Corporate Loan Markets
研究发现，在贷款市场中，银行数量越多，利率、借款人风险和贷款量反而更高，这与逆向选择理论一致，即风险更高的借款人更可能获得贷款。
ABSTRACT Theories of competition typically predict a positive relationship between market concentration and prices. However, in loan markets, adverse selection can reverse this relationship as riskier borrowers become more likely to receive funding. Using supervisory data, we show that interest rates, borrower risk, and lending volume are higher in markets with more banks. We also create a novel measure of markup that is orthogonal to borrower risk, and find that, consistent with adverse selection, markups are higher after repeated borrowing relationships. Finally, we use a shock to large banks' lending costs to provide further support for the adverse selection channel.