CEO inside debt compensation and the asset sale decision
研究发现CEO内部债务薪酬越高，企业越可能出售非核心资产，且出售后自由现金流增加，表明内部债务促使高管进行聚焦主业、创造现金的交易，尤其在低流动性、高风险企业中更显著。
Abstract We find that CEOs with relatively high inside debt compensation are more likely to engage in non‐core asset sales. Firms selling non‐core assets show higher post‐sale free cash flow, suggesting that inside debt encourages focus‐increasing, cash‐generating transactions. The positive relation between inside debt and asset sales is only evident among firms with low liquidity and high risk, as well as among CEOs with longer career horizons and lower levels of incentive‐based compensation, consistent with liquidity enhancement and risk aversion driving asset‐sale decisions. Our findings highlight the role of inside debt in aligning the interests of executives and the firm's debtholders.