Competition between sellers in security-bid auctions: An experimental study
通过实验比较垄断与竞争环境下证券竞拍的效果，发现竞争时股权设计能显著提高拍卖收入，但卖方选择股权的比例在两种情境下无差异。
Abstract We study how competition impacts security-bid auctions by comparing Monopolistic and Competitive auctions. Sellers choose their security designs between debt and equity, and buyers select auctions based on sellers’ choices. We find that an auction’s security design has limited influence on revenue under monopoly, whereas equity substantially increases revenue under competition due to equity attracting more bidders. Despite this, sellers’ rate of choosing equity does not differ between the treatments. While theory suggests that security choice when acting as a buyer should be negatively correlated to one’s choice as a seller, we find the empirical correlation to be positive.