Surprise in contests
研究了一个两玩家非对称动态竞赛，其中玩家通过先发制人制造惊喜来获胜，分析了混合策略下的子博弈完美均衡，发现惊喜概率随时间增加，在最后一刻最高，但努力成本低时仍较小。
Abstract We consider a two-player asymmetric dynamic contest with a binary effort choice and a finite number of periods, in which one player wins if and only if he is able to surprise his rival by attacking first. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which the probability of a surprise increases over time, is examined. It is found that the chance of a surprise is highest at the “last minute.” Nonetheless, it remains small if the cost of effort is small. With an infinite horizon, the probability remains constant over time; however, it increases as players become more impatient. Applications are discussed.