Tax Professionals and Tax Evasion
利用意大利个体经营者的审计数据，研究发现税务顾问充当信息枢纽，利用审计政策信息帮助客户制定报税策略，形成逃税中介市场，纳税人根据顾问的逃税容忍度进行自我选择。
Abstract Using unique data covering the entire population of sole proprietorships in Italy with their respective audit files, we examine the role of tax advisors in tax compliance. Exploiting quasi-random variation in audit policy, we document that tax advisors act as information hubs, gathering privileged information on the auditing policy from their activities and incorporating it into the tax return strategy of their clients. The heterogeneity in tax advisors’ willingness to serve this role establishes a market for intermediated tax evasion, in which taxpayers sort themselves on the basis of the tax advisors’ tolerance for it.