Mandatory central clearing and derivatives offsetting
利用美国强制中央清算政策的实施，研究发现不同资本充足率的银行在衍生品抵消行为上出现分化，高资本银行增加抵消而低资本银行减少抵消，对监管政策制定有参考价值。
Exploiting the adoption of mandatory central clearing by US regulators, we explore the effects of this regulatory reform on banks’ derivatives offsetting. Using a difference-in-differences testing procedure, we find that derivatives offsetting increases (decreases) for banks with higher (lower) capital ratios after the adoption of mandatory central clearing, in comparison with the control group. The results are economically significant and robust to a variety of alternative specifications and tests. Our findings suggest that banks with different target capital ratios respond to central clearing reform differently. These findings may inform regulators and policy makers about the effects of the central clearing reform and its impact on market transparency.