Beyond Dangling Carrots: The Effect of Policy Maker Motives on Their Response to Corporate Political Activity
从政策制定者视角出发，基于社会影响理论，分析其非工具性动机如何影响对企业政治活动的回应，并探讨官僚与游说者的作用，帮助理解企业影响政策的机制。
Management scholars have predominantly theorized corporate political activity (CPA) as an exchange wherein a firm offers resources to a policy maker in return for favorable policy. While the CPA literature has extensively explored what drives firms to engage in CPA, it remains largely silent on the question of why a policy maker would accede to a firm’s attempt at influence. Drawing on social influence theory, we develop a framework that extends current CPA theory and centers a policy maker’s perspective when faced with CPA. We introduce a policy maker’s noninstrumental motives and identify novel types of CPA that appeal to these motives. We also consider the role of the bureaucrat—a heretofore largely ignored but important type of policy maker whose motives differ from those of politicians in key respects that shape whether and how a given policy maker is influenced. Lastly, we examine how third-party lobbyists affect the CPA process, identifying key pathways through which they are likely to enhance a firm’s CPA. By theorizing around the motives of the policy maker faced with CPA, we present a novel policy maker-centered framework that helps us better understand this socially and economically important strategy.