Price Coordination with Asymmetric Information Sharing: Theory and Evidence
受Informed Sources零售汽油反垄断案启发，构建理论模型研究平台信息共享如何促进竞争企业间的价格协调，发现仅移除一家企业无效，需至少两家无平台接入且价格领导成本足够高才能破坏协调。
Abstract Platform-based information sharing among competing firms presents challenges for antitrust authorities, yet effective remedies remain unclear. Drawing inspiration from the Informed Sources retail gasoline antitrust case, we develop a theoretical model that offers policy guidance for disrupting anticompetitive coordination facilitated through price-sharing platforms. Removing only one firm from a platform may be ineffective for disrupting such coordination. However, competitive benefits can emerge if (i) at least two firms lack platform access, and (ii) the costs of price leadership are sufficiently high. More broadly, coordinating price increases becomes more difficult when multiple firms cannot quickly observe or respond to rivals' prices.