Migrants as Social Protection? Simulations of a Market for Work Permits
研究了通过建立工作许可的双边竞争市场，为移民目的国工人提供基本收入保障，并模拟了墨西哥与美国之间的工作许可市场。
Abstract Workershave the right to take up any job offer in their country of citizenship but not to rent out that right. This paper shows that relaxing this restriction using a two-sided competitive market in work permits can provide a basic income guarantee for workers in migration-destination countries, financed by selling temporary work permits to migrant workers. Regulating the market by imposing a tax on work permits narrows the set of beneficiaries, the income of which can further be complemented with the revenues from such tax. Substantial gains in the destination countries’ gross domestic product can be expected, alongside the first-order gains to migrant workers who would not otherwise have access to the labor markets in destination countries. The paper provides a quantitative illustration by simulating a fictitious market for work permits between Mexico and the United States.