Moral hazard severity and contract design
指出，在代理人需同时为努力创造项目和如实报告项目完成而获得补偿的委托代理环境中，Holmstrom的“信息量准则”本身不足以决定变量是否应纳入合同，道德风险问题的严重程度也起关键作用。
In an agency setting where the agent must be compensated both to exert effort to produce a new project and to announce honestly when the new project has been produced, we show that Holmstrom's (1979) well-known "informativeness criterion" does not, by itself, determine whether a variable is optimally incorporated into the agent's contract. What also matters is how "severe" the control problem is between the principal and the agent. We further show that the severity of the moral hazard problem also determines whether it is desirable for the principal to have the agent implement the project more often that warranted by first-best implementation considerations.