Evolution, Correlated Equilibrium, and Strictness
研究了在单调演化动态下，玩家接收关联信号时，结果集在纳什均衡凸包外也能渐近稳定；证明了渐近稳定的条件策略集必须是严格关联均衡集，且内生信号下渐近稳定结果只能是严格纳什均衡。
A set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to monotonic evolutionary dynamics if the players receive correlated signals. In this paper boundedly rational agents condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is asymptotically stable only if it represents a strict (correlated-)equilibrium set. There are correlated equilibria that cannot be represented by an asymptotically stable signal contingent strategy. For generic games it is shown that if signals are endogenous, no player has an incentive to manipulate the signal generating process and if the signal contingent strategy is asymptotically stable, then and only then, the outcome must be a strict Nash equilibrium.