Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
通过一次性委托代理实验，研究激励合同是否传递社会规范并影响行为，发现知情委托人选择固定工资合同时，代理人付出更高努力，表明合同选择传递了不利用信任的规范。
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A one-shot principal–agent experiment is studied where prior to contract choice principals are informed about the past actions of other agents and thus have more information about norms of behavior. Compared with a setting in which principals are uninformed, agents exert substantially higher effort under a fixed wage contract when they are aware that an informed principal chose this contract. The informed principal’s choice apparently signals a norm not to exploit trust, which leads to more trustworthy behavior. This mechanism’s robustness is explored in further experiments. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2336 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.