Market Design and Moral Behavior
通过739名受试者的实验，研究了不同干预措施（如金钱惩罚、匿名性去除）在个人决策和双向拍卖市场两种制度下对道德行为的影响，发现金钱惩罚在两种制度下均促进道德行为，而匿名性去除的效果因制度而异。
In an experiment with 739 subjects, we study whether and how different interventions might have an influence on the degree of moral behavior when subjects make decisions that can generate negative externalities on uninvolved parties. Particularly, subjects can either take money for themselves or donate it to UNICEF for measles vaccines. By considering two fairly different institutional regimes—one with individual decision making, one with a double-auction market—we expose the different interventions to a kind of robustness check. We find that the threat of monetary punishment promotes moral behavior in both regimes. Getting subjects more involved with the traded good has no effect, though, in both regimes. Only the removal of anonymity, thus making subjects identifiable, has different effects across regimes, which we explain by different perceptions of responsibility. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.