Unionization, information asymmetry and the de‐location of firms
研究了工会化如何影响企业迁移到国外的决策，发现工会通过设计工资-就业合同，导致高生产率企业被排除在外，且存在过度就业现象。
Abstract We analyze the effects of unionization on the decision of a firm to de‐locate internationally. In a model in which home and foreign workers are perfect substitutes and firms have an informational advantage concerning their productivity, the union offers a menu of wage–employment contracts. Because firms' outside options (producing abroad) depend on productivity, the problem is characterized by countervailing incentives. With the foreign profit sufficiently increasing in productivity, the overstating incentive dominates in equilibrium. Contracts are then characterized by overemployment. The union also affects the extensive margin. High‐productivity firms are excluded because this narrows the possibility to overstate productivity, which saves on information rent. Using a numerical simulation, we show that these effects are quantitatively sizable.