Managerial Long-Term Responsibility in Family-Controlled Firms
结合文献综述与管家理论、高层梯队理论，提出管理者长期责任的概念，并构建模型解释家族企业为何更倾向于长期导向，对研究家族企业治理与战略的学者有参考价值。
Evidence suggests that long-term orientation (LTO) as a dominant strategic logic contributes to the sustainable performance of family-controlled firms (FCFS). Combining a review of the literature on lto with stewardship theory and upper echelons theory reasoning, this article presents a typology of managerial responsibility and introduces the concept of long-term responsibility as a managerial characteristic constituting a major driving force behind creating lto. The antecedents of long-term responsibility under family firm-specific conditions (stemming from the family system, the governance system, and family-firm managers’ personal characteristics) are also identified and presented in an integrated model. The paper contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of intertemporal choice in fcfs and explains why they tend to be more long-term oriented than other types of firms.