The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets
研究了美国多频道电视市场中地区体育网与节目分销商纵向一体化对福利的影响，发现其既能通过减少双重加价提高效率，也可能因排挤对手而损害福利，并评估了相关监管政策的效果。
We investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration of regional sports networks (RSNs) with programming distributors in U.S. multichannel television markets. Vertical integration can enhance efficiency by reducing double marginalization and increasing carriage of channels, but can also harm welfare due to foreclosure and raising rivals' costs incentives. We estimate a structural model of viewership, subscription, distributor pricing, and affiliate fee bargaining using a rich dataset on the U.S. cable and satellite television industry (2000-2010). We use these estimates to analyze the impact of simulated vertical mergers and de-mergers of RSNs on competition and welfare, and examine the efficacy of regulatory policies introduced by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to address competition concerns in this industry.