Bargaining under monotonicity constraints
研究了在单调性约束下（即玩家按固定顺序分配盈余，排名高的不能拿得少）的全体一致讨价还价问题，发现均衡结果在谈判破裂概率趋近于零时收敛于平均分配，与纳什讨价还价解一致。
We study unanimity bargaining on the division of a surplus in the presence of monotonicity constraints. The monotonicity constraints specify a complete order on the players, which has to be respected by the shares in the surplus the players obtain in any bargaining outcome. A player higher in the order should not receive a lower share of the surplus. We analyze the resulting subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies and show that they are characterized by the simpler notion of bargaining equilibrium. Bargaining equilibria are shown to be unique and to have the property that players ranked strictly higher obtain strictly higher shares in the surplus. The key question is whether the bargaining advantage of a higher-ranked player persists when the probability of breakdown of bargaining tends to zero. We argue that such is not the case by showing that bargaining equilibria have a unique limit equal to an equal division of the surplus. It then follows that the limit also coincides with the Nash bargaining solution for this problem.