Reduced Quality and an Unlevel Playing Field Could Make Consumers Happier
研究在有限产能下，企业降低质量以增加产量，反而可能提高社会福利；在某些情况下，减少竞争也能增加产量、降低平均质量并提升消费者福利。
We study a model of imperfect competition and limited production capacity in which a key feature is the trade-off between quality and quantity. In particular, lowering product quality enables firms to increase total production. We illustrate that, in the presence of limited capacity, the choice of lower quality often results in increased social welfare. We also explore the relation between the extent of competition and the choice of quality. We find that, in some cases, reduced competition leads to increased production, decreased average quality, increased total welfare, and makes consumers better off. Finally, we consider the possibility of regulator-mandated quality standards. Imposing high-quality standards never improves welfare in our model. On the other hand, mandating an upper bound on quality could either increase or decrease welfare in either a monopoly or a duopoly market.