Peacekeeping: A strategic approach
本文构建了一个两方冲突与维和部队干预的理论模型，提出维和部队的最优部署策略，通过可信的武力威胁而非单纯干预来最小化冲突水平。
Abstract This paper presents a theoretical model of conflict between two players, with intervention by a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers are treated as a military contingent, capable of taking sides, acting as a third (independent) side in the war or remaining inactive, depending on circumstances. This departs from previous models, in which peacekeeping was no more than a parameter affecting players' fighting costs. The main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peacekeepers, detailing the nature and level of intervention required under different circumstances; this strategy results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The credible threat of force (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key component.