Unveiling Megaproject Innovative Collaboration Through Game Theory: Evidence From China
该研究构建复杂网络演化博弈模型，利用中国詹天佑奖数据模拟大型项目技术创新网络中组织间的合作策略与动态模式，为管理者设计考虑组织异质性的合作机制提供理论指导。
Understanding collaboration strategies and dynamic patterns among organizations with unequal status in megaproject technological innovation networks represents a critical research issue, as it profoundly influences the innovation performance and ultimate success of megaprojects. However, existing research inadequately addresses the significant impact of network characteristics and organizational status disparities on megaproject innovations. To address this gap, the study develops a complex network evolutionary game-theoretic model and leverages Tien-yow Jeme Civil Engineering Prize data to simulate stability conditions and dynamic patterns of inter-organizational collaboration. This paper verifies the model's equilibrium and stability conditions on random and scale-free networks, and conducts sensitivity analyses of several key factors in an empirical network, further confirming their robustness. Findings indicate that rationalizing the benefit-distribution system, reputation and punishment mechanisms can promote active collaboration within core organizations, while controlling spillover benefits helps to curb free-rider behavior in general organizations. Moreover, the appropriate configuration of these elements shall balance the fluctuations and inconsistencies between network-level indicators, not merely the organizational strategic transitions. This study offers project managers and scholars a novel theoretical lens for strategy evolution in collaborative networks and provides actionable insights for designing mechanisms that consider organizational heterogeneity to enhance innovation outcomes in megaprojects.