Corporate governance, CEO compensation, and cross-border M&A synergies for acquiring banks
研究了1997至2023年全球银行业跨境并购中收购方和目标的回报，发现CEO薪酬激励和董事会结构影响收购方长期表现，而监管套利驱动的并购往往表现不佳。
This paper empirically examines the performance implications of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CB M&As) in the global banking sector, focusing on the returns of both bidders and targets across multiple event windows. Using an international sample from 1997 to 2023, we compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over short- and long-term horizons and employ logit model to identify key cross-border deal determinants. While target firms consistently earn significant positive abnormal returns, acquirer gains materialize primarily in the long run. Notably, we find that acquirer performance is shaped by CEO compensation incentives and board structure, particularly the number of managing directors. Acquirers with performance-aligned CEO pay and smaller, more independent boards tend to achieve superior post-deal outcomes. Additionally, we identify regulatory arbitrage as a driver of some CB-M&As, where firms seek jurisdictions with looser oversight; however, these deals often underperform due to governance and integration challenges. Our findings highlight the interplay between governance, regulation, and long-term value creation in CB M&As.