Independent directors in family PLCs in the majority world − insights from a Middle Eastern country
本文以科威特家族上市公司为例，批判性审视独立董事概念在非西方背景下的实践，发现独立性多为象征性，独立成员通过社交网络选拔，更看重忠诚而非监督。
This paper critically examines the concept of board member ‘independence’ by drawing on Max Weber’s notion of traditionalism to theorise its practice in non-Western or Majority World contexts. Using family-owned public limited companies (PLCs) in Kuwait as a case study, we explore how cultural norms, political-economic histories, and kinship-based authority structures shape the recruitment, roles, and influence of supposedly independent committee members. Based on qualitative data − including interviews, archival materials, and field observations − we find that independence is largely symbolic. Independent members are often selected through Diwaniya-based social networks and valued more for their loyalty and discretion than for providing impartial oversight. The relationship between family owners and independent members reflects Weber’s chief–subject model, with board processes grounded in personalist logics rather than the institutional rationalities of Western capitalist governance. This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by rethinking independence through a cultural-political lens and calls for policies and research that promote context-sensitive, decolonial approaches to governance in the Majority World.