Invoking Security to Bypass Procedure: The European Union's Critical Medicines Act
本文分析欧盟关键药品法案未经标准民主程序出台，质疑其紧急性和合法性，指出绕过程序可能加剧欧盟治理的民主赤字。
Abstract The European Union's recently proposed Critical Medicines Act (CMA) was published without recourse to standard democratic policy‐making procedures. Framed by the European Commission as an urgent response to a pressing security threat, the CMA was not subject to an impact assessment, and the stakeholder consultation designed to inform its development was both short and last‐minute. In this commentary, we examine the implications of the CMA case for the democratic legitimacy of EU policy‐making. We argue that, since medicine shortages have been on the EU agenda for nearly a decade and the CMA extends beyond emergency provisions to address long‐term industrial policy, it does not constitute an urgent or exceptional policy issue in the usual sense. Situating the CMA within wider patterns of EU health securitisation, we highlight the risks posed by circumventing procedural safeguards, concluding that this shift may exacerbate perceptions of a democratic deficit within EU governance.