Missing markets. Microstructure and liquidity on the London Stock Exchange
研究了19世纪70年代伦敦证券交易所专业交易商的行为，发现他们集中于流动性最强的证券做市，而逆向选择和库存成本阻碍了多数证券的流动性市场发展，转而提供撮合服务。
This paper studies the behavior of specialist dealers operating in the London Stock Exchange in the 1870s. The LSE was a free-entry exclusive dealers market, where dealers were free to choose which securities to deal in. We show that dealers concentrated their market making in the most liquid securities. A combination of adverse selection and inventory costs prevented the development of liquid markets in most securities, with dealers opting instead to provide matchmaking services. Our results call for a reappreciation of the liquidity of the London market and offer a new interpretation of stylized facts about the Victorian investor behavior.