社会经济阴影:机构主管的阶级背景及其与政治官员的关系

Socioeconomic Shadows: Agency Directors’ Class Background and Their Relationships with Political Officials

The American Review of Public Administration · 2025
被引 0
ABS 3

中文导读

研究美国州级机构主管的童年社会经济地位如何影响其与政治官员的互动频率及感知的州长影响力,发现高阶层背景的主管更常接触政治精英且更少受州长干预,凸显阶级背景在公共行政中的重要性。

Abstract

Drawing on theoretical perspectives from the literature on childhood socialization and cultural capital, we investigate how the socioeconomic status (SES) background of public administrators shapes their relationships with elected political officials and their staff. Analyses of over 30 years of survey data indicate that American state agency directors from higher SES backgrounds report more frequent interaction with political principals, suggesting that early-life exposure to elite norms and the accumulation of cultural capital facilitate access and ease in elite political spaces. In addition, these administrators report lower levels of perceived gubernatorial influence on major policy changes and agency rules and regulations, indicating the potential for high SES socialization to buttress bureaucratic autonomy and administrative discretion. These findings underscore the importance of class background as a formative social identity, and suggest that scholars should take it seriously in public administration research, particularly as a dimension of social equity and elite political navigation.

公共管理政治学社会阶层官僚自主性精英政治