Financing Strategies and Market Outcomes for SMEs on E-platforms: Monopoly versus Competition
通过博弈模型比较垄断与竞争平台下中小企业融资策略和市场绩效，发现垄断平台低利率时中小企业收益更高，但竞争平台消费者剩余更大。
With the rise of platform-based economies, an increasing number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are selling products through electronic platforms (E-platforms). These SMEs often face financing constraints, and E-platforms have emerged as alternative credit providers to alleviate their budget limitations. This paper develops a game-theoretical model to investigate the strategic interactions and performance outcomes of the E-platforms and SMEs in a competitive market environment. In our framework, E-platforms compete indirectly via the product market by setting loan terms, while SMEs decide on borrowing levels and production quantities. We compare two market structures: a monopoly platform versus multiple competing platforms. Counterintuitively, our analysis reveals that SMEs—as well as the platform—may achieve higher payoffs under a monopoly, particularly when the platform offers relatively low interest rates. However, consumer surplus tends to be higher in competitive platform markets. To test the robustness of these findings, we extend the model to incorporate heterogeneity in SME characteristics, e.g. initial budget levels, random demand shocks, alternative demand functions, and endogenous interest rates. Our results shed light on why different platform configurations may prevail across markets and provide actionable insights for platform managers and policymakers aiming to balance competition, efficiency, and SME development.