Costly Multidimensional Screening
研究了当代理人拥有可分离的多维私人信息时，委托人是否应使用高成本的筛选工具。发现若两个维度偏好正相关，仅筛选生产性维度即为最优，适用于垄断定价、捆绑销售等场景。
Abstract A screening instrument is costly if it is socially wasteful and productive otherwise. A principal screens an agent with multidimensional private information and quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across two components: a one-dimensional productive component and a multidimensional costly component. Can the principal improve upon simple one-dimensional mechanisms by also using the costly instruments? We show that if the agent has preferences between the two components that are positively correlated in a suitably defined sense, then simply screening the productive component is optimal. The result holds for general type and allocation spaces, and allows for nonlinear and interdependent valuations. We discuss applications to monopoly pricing, bundling, and labour market screening.