Financial Regulation Policy Uncertainty and Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure
研究了金融监管政策不确定性如何影响管理者自愿披露非GAAP盈余的决策，发现不确定性高时管理者更可能披露且更激进，但质量下降，投资者信任度降低。
We examine how uncertainty surrounding financial regulation policies affects managers’ discretionary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. Our findings suggest that when financial regulation policy uncertainty is high, managers are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings to attract investors. We also find that managers become more aggressive in reporting non-GAAP earnings, particularly by excluding more recurring expenses during uncertain periods. Our findings of both a higher likelihood and lower quality of non-GAAP reporting are more pronounced among financially distressed firms, as these firms are more sensitive to the impact of financial regulatory uncertainty. Further analysis indicates that, as non-GAAP earnings become less informative in such times, investors place less trust in them. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that uncertainty in the financial regulatory process exerts a negative externality on voluntary disclosure practices by company management.