Does Political Homophily Affect Mutual Funds’ Behavior? Evidence From Their Voting
研究发现，共同基金与公司管理层政治立场越一致，越倾向于支持管理层提案，且这种政治一致会损害公司绩效和股东利益。
ABSTRACT Do political partisanship and homophily between institutional investors and corporate managers matter? We find that mutual funds are more likely to vote with the management when they are more politically aligned with the managers in the firm. This result holds in a quasi‐natural experiment setting of mutual fund manager turnovers that are arguably exogenous to the political homophily within a given fund–firm pair. Unlike misaligned fund managers, the vote of politically aligned ones against management proposals is also predictive of poor future performance. Politically aligned fund managers bring economic costs for the shareholders of a firm. A stronger alignment in partisanship is negatively associated with CEO pay–performance sensitivity and firm profitability. These results are consistent with fund managers having politically biased expectations that influence their voting choices.