Tying with Network Effects
研究了当垄断厂商无法完全榨取消费者剩余时，捆绑销售如何利用未开发的消费者剩余作为需求侧杠杆，在网络效应市场中创造准安装基础优势，并分析其福利影响。
We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a “quasi-installed base” advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects.