The Interplay Between Strategic Information Sharing and Quality Decision: Pre-quality Versus Post-quality
研究了零售商信息共享策略与制造商质量决策在不同决策顺序下的互动，发现零售商在质量后决策时倾向于分享高需求信息而隐瞒低需求信息，在质量前决策时则相反，且零售商利润可能随信息成本上升而增加。
This paper examines the interplay between the retailer's strategic information sharing and the manufacturer's quality decisions under two decision sequences: pre-quality and post-quality scenarios. We analyze the retailer's ex-post information sharing policy (deciding how to share the obtained demand information) under both sequences, discuss the impact of decision sequences on the quality level, and explore the preferences of supply chain participants for pre- and post-quality scenarios. The key findings are as follows: In the post-quality scenario, if consumers have high quality sensitivity, the retailer tends to share high-demand information but conceal low-demand information; otherwise, the result is just the opposite. Conversely, in the pre-quality scenario, the retailer consistently shares low-demand information but conceals high-demand information. Notably, whether in the pre-quality or post-quality scenario, an intriguing phenomenon may emerge, that is, the retailer may experience a counterintuitive increase in profit as the expected information cost rises. The outcomes of quality levels in pre- and post-quality scenarios depend on the information status obtained by the retailer and the consumers' quality sensitivity. Interestingly, the retailer consistently prefers the post-quality scenario, while the manufacturer may prefer the pre-quality scenario under certain conditions. Finally, our findings remain relatively robust when considering imperfect information acquisition or a general demand distribution.